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ABSTRACT
Machine learning has become a critical component of modern data-
driven online services. Typically, the training phase of machine
learning techniques requires to process large-scale datasets which
may contain private and sensitive information of customers. This
imposes significant security risks since modern online services
rely on cloud computing to store and process the sensitive data.
In the untrusted computing infrastructure, security is becoming
a paramount concern since the customers need to trust the third-
party cloud provider. Unfortunately, this trust has been violated
multiple times in the past.
To overcome the potential security risks in the cloud, we answer
the following research question: how to enable secure executions of
machine learning computations in the untrusted infrastructure? To
achieve this goal, we propose a hardware-assisted approach based
on Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), specifically Intel SGX,
to enable secure execution of the machine learning computations
over the private and sensitive datasets. More specifically, we pro-
pose a generic and secure machine learning framework based on
Tensorflow, which enables secure execution of existing applications
on the commodity untrusted infrastructure. In particular, we have
built our system called TensorSCONE from ground-up by inte-
grating TensorFlow with SCONE, a shielded execution framework
based on Intel SGX. The main challenge of this work is to overcome
the architectural limitations of Intel SGX in the context of building
a secure TensorFlow system. Our evaluation shows that we achieve
reasonable performance overheads while providing strong security
properties with low TCB.
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning has become an increasingly popular approach
for solving various practical problems in data-driven online ser-
vices [5, 18, 24, 57]. While these learning techniques based on pri-
vate data arguably provide useful online services, they also pose
serious security threats for the users. Especially, when thesemodern
online services use the third-party untrusted cloud infrastructure
for deploying these computations.
In the untrusted computing infrastructure, an attacker can com-
promise the confidentiality and integrity of the computation. There-
fore, the risk of security violations in untrusted infrastructure has
increased significantly in the third-party cloud computing infras-
tructure [49]. In fact, many studies show that software bugs, con-
figuration errors, and security vulnerabilities pose a serious threat
to computations in the cloud systems [17, 26, 50]. Furthermore,
since the data is stored outside the control of the data owner, the
third-party cloud platform provides an additional attack vector.
The clients currently have limited support to verify whether the
third-party operator, even with good intentions, can handle the
data with the stated security guarantees [31, 61].
To overcome the security risks in the cloud, our work focuses on
securing machine learning computations in the untrusted comput-
ing infrastructure. In this context, the existing techniques to secure
machine learning applications are limiting in performance [25],
trade accuracy for security [23] or support only data classification
[20]. Therefore, we want to build a secure machine learning frame-
work that supports existing applications while retaining accuracy,
supporting both training and classification, and without compromis-
ing the performance.
To achieve our design goals, we aim to leverage the advance-
ments in trusted execution environments (TEEs), such as Intel
SGX [6] or ARM TrustZone [14], to build a secure machine learning
system. In fact, given the importance of security threats in the cloud,
there is a recent surge in leveraging TEEs for shielded execution
of applications in the untrusted infrastructure [15, 17, 39, 52, 60].
Shielded execution aims to provide strong confidentiality and in-
tegrity properties for applications using a hardware-protected se-
cure memory region or enclave.
While these shielded execution frameworks provide strong secu-
rity guarantees against a powerful adversary, these systems have
not been designed in the context of securing an existing machine
learning framework, such as TensorFlow [12]. To bridge this re-
search gap, we propose TensorSCONE, a secure machine learning
framework that supports both training and classification phases,
while providing all three important design properties: transparency,
accuracy, and performance. More specifically, we base our design on
TensorFlow, a widely-used machine learning framework. Our design
builds on integrating TensorFlow with the SCONE [15] shielded
execution framework based on Intel SGX.
However, it is not that straightforward to build a secure ma-
chine learning system using shielded execution since it requires
supporting unmodified applications without compromising the
performance. Especially, we need to address three architectural
limitations of shielded execution in our context: Firstly, the secure
enclave physical memory region is quite limited in size, and incurs
high performance overheads for memory accesses due to secure
paging. This implies that we need to ensure that the memory foot-
print of TensorFlow library is minimal. Further, since the input
dataset cannot fit into the enclave memory, we need to ensure that
the data can be securely stored in the untrusted host memory and
the untrusted file system. Secondly, the syscall-based I/O operations
are quite expensive in the context of shielded execution since the
thread executing the system call has to exit the enclave, and perform
a secure context switch, including TLB flushing, security checks,
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etc. Therefore, it is clearly not well-suited for building a secure
intelligent application that requires frequent I/O calls. Lastly, since
the TEE cannot give any security guarantees beyond the enclave
memory, we need to design mechanisms for extending the trust to
a distributed computing environment, which requires extending
the trust over the network interface.
To overcome these design challenges, we present TensorSCONE,
a secure machine learning framework for the untrusted infrastruc-
ture. Overall, we make the following contributions.
• We have designed and implemented TensorSCONE as the
end-to-end system based on TensorFlow and SCONE that al-
lows secure execution of the existing unmodified TensorFlow
applications without compromising the accuracy.
• We optimized the performance to overcome the architectural
limitation of Intel SGX in the context of machine learning
workloads.
• We evaluated TensorSCONEwith several microbenchmarks
and a real world application. Our evaluation shows that
TensorSCONE achieves reasonable performance overheads,
while providing strong security with low TCB.
An early version of TensorSCONE is already upstreamed and
available as part of the SCONE framework for production use:
https://sconedocs.github.io/tensorflowlite/
2 BACKGROUND AND THREAT MODEL
2.1 Intel SGX and Shielded Execution
Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) is a set of x86 ISA extensions
for Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [22]. SGX provides an
abstraction of secure enclave—a hardware-protected memory re-
gion for which the CPU guarantees the confidentiality and integrity
of the data and code residing in the enclave memory. The enclave
memory is located in the Enclave Page Cache (EPC)—a dedicated
memory region protected by an on-chip Memory Encryption En-
gine (MEE). The MEE encrypts and decrypts cache lines with writes
and reads in the EPC, respectively. Intel SGX supports a call-gate
mechanism to control entry and exit into the TEE.
Shielded execution based on Intel SGX aims to provide strong
confidentiality and integrity guarantees for applications deployed
on an untrusted computing infrastructure [15, 17, 39, 52, 60]. Our
work builds on the SCONE [15] shielded execution framework. In
the SCONE framework, the applications are statically compiled and
linked against a modified standard C library (SCONE libc). In this
model, application’s address space is confined to the enclave mem-
ory, and interaction with the untrusted memory is performed via
the system call interface. In particular, SCONE runtime provides an
asynchronous system call mechanism [55] in which threads outside
the enclave asynchronously execute the system calls. Furthermore,
it ensures memory safety [37] for the applications running inside
the SGX enclaves [34]. Lastly, SCONE provides an integration to
Docker for seamlessly deploying container images.
2.2 Machine Learning using TensorFlow
Machine learning approaches aim to find solutions to problems
by automatically deducing the required domain knowledge from
example datasets [53]. Particularly, statistical models are leveraged
Figure 1: Overview of the machine learning approach. The
user provides a model according to the task and training
data divided into training and evaluation data. The training
data is used to update the parameters θ of themodel in order
to fit the training data, while the evaluation data is used to
judge the solution. Data, which is to be classified later, is fed
into the model the same way.
to allow an information retrieval system to generalize and learn do-
main knowledge in order to solve a specific task. Broadly speaking,
the machine learning approaches can be distinguished: supervised,
unsupervised and reinforcement learning. All forms have in com-
mon that they require data sets, a defined objective function, a
model and a way to update the model according to new inputs. In
our work, we focus on supervised learning, but our approach is
generalizable to the other two types. An overview of the process
can be seen in Figure 1.
To generalize the machine learning approach for masses, Google
proposed TensorFlow [12] as a machine learning framework de-
signed for heterogeneous distributed systems. TensorFlow requires
the user to first define a directed graph consisting of nodes repre-
senting operations on incoming data. Nodes perform computations
on different levels of abstraction such as matrix multiplication, pool-
ing or reading data from disk. Nodes can also have an internal state,
depending on their type. The stateful operations called Variable
which contains mutable buffer used to store shared and persistent
state across multiple iterations. The data flows along the directed
edges in the graph called Tensors — the n-dimensional abstraction
of matrices.
After defining the graph, the user can perform calculations in
the graph by starting a session and running the previously defined
operations. TensorFlow uses a dataflow model for calculations, in
which an output of one operation(i.e., a node) becomes the input
for another operation.
Currently, TensorFlow supports distributed training, allowing
part of the graph to be computed on different physical devices.
TensorFlow can be deployed on mobile devices, single personal
computers, as well as computer clusters, by mapping the computa-
tion graph on available hardware. This framework allows multiple
devices to be used to train a model, with parameters and weights
being shared between them. Each iteration of the execution over
the computation graph is called a step.
TensorFlow Lite [10] is a feature-reduced version of TensorFlow,
designed for mobile and embedded devices. Optimization for mobile
devices is achieved by running a mobile-optimized interpreter that
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keeps the load at a lower level and by keeping the overall binary size
smaller when compared to full TensorFlow, among other measures.
The number of available operations for defining a graph is re-
duced to achieve a smaller memory footprint of the resulting binary.
Currently, TensorFlow Lite does not support training. To use the
framework, a model must first be training with the full version of
TensorFlow and then exported and converted to a special Tensor-
Flow Lite model format. This format can then be used from the
TensorFlow Lite API for inference.
2.3 Threat Model
We aim to protect against a very powerful adversary even in the
presence of complex software layers in the virtualized cloud com-
puting infrastructure [17]. In this setting, the adversary can control
the entire system software stack, including the OS or the hypervisor,
and is able to launch physical attacks, such as performing memory
probes. Even under the extreme threat model, our goal is to guar-
antee data integrity, confidentiality, and freshness. Data freshness
property ensures that the data is recent and there is no old state of
data has been replayed. We also provide bindings with Pesos [31],
a secure storage system to protect against rollback attacks [40] on
the data stored beyond the secure enclave memory. Further, since
we provide memory safety using SGXBounds [34], TensorSCONE
is resilient to an important class of code-reuse attacks on SGX [19].
However, we do not protect against side-channel attacks based
on cache timing and speculative execution [62], and memory access
patterns [27, 67]. Mitigating side-channel attacks is an active area
of research [38]. Lastly, we do not consider denial of service attacks
since these attacks are trivial for a third-party operator controlling
the underlying infrastructure [17]. Lastly, we assume that the ad-
versary cannot physically open the processor packaging to extract
secrets or corrupt the CPU system state.
3 DESIGN
In this section, we present the design of TensorSCONE.
3.1 Overview
At a high-level, our strawman design consists of the Tensor machine
learning framework, which is secured by the hardware-assisted
trusted execution environment (TEE). We base our design on Ten-
sorFlow and TensorFlow Lite for supporting the machine learning
workloads. TensorFlow Lite has the additional advantage of having
a smaller memory footprint. The TEE we choose for our work is
Intel SGX. Using Intel SGX directly to secure an application requires
rewriting the application specifically for SGX, which can be com-
plex. We therefore use SCONE as an additional layer that allows
access to SGX features with fewer changes to application code.
While there are other options available, we choose SCONE, because
of the relatively small extra work required to run an application and
comparatively small overhead compared to other available options.
In particular, we integrated TensorFlow with the SCONE shielded
execution framework. Figure 2 presents the general architecture of
TensorSCONE.
As the first step, when a user deploys an application on a remote
host, the user can only be certain the correct application is running
untampered with, if the application is running inside a TEE, and
Trusted SGX enclave memory
TensorSCONE controller 
SCONE
Operating system
Network 
shield
Filesystem
shield
Userspace
threading
TensorSCONE TensorFlow Library
TensorFlow application
Figure 2: The architecture of TensorSCONE.
the identity of the application has been proven. The attestation step
is therefore an integral part of the life cycle of common TEEs. SGX
offers attestation mechanisms as well. However, SCONE, as an ad-
ditional layer between SGX and application, exposes a standardized
interface for performing remote attestation that is independent of a
particular application.We therefore leverage the SCONE framework
to provide the remote attestation mechanism to verify the proof of
integrity and security of the application running on a distributed
cluster of machines inside the cloud.
The communication channel for data exchange between Ten-
sorSCONE and the user must be private and secure. The security of
this channel must be end-to-end protected, starting inside the TEE
and terminating at the user side. The TLS protocol offers all proper-
ties we need. Finally, we use Docker for easier distribution of our
system. In particular, we use the SCONE infrastructure for securely
distributing configuration for the containerized applications.
Design goals. Our primary design goal is to achieve strong con-
fidentiality and integrity properties for the secure execution of
machine learning applications. By confidentiality, we mean that
all data handled by the machine learning framework and the ma-
chine learning framework code itself may not be disclosed to or
obtainable by an unauthorized party. By integrity, we mean that
modifications of the data handled by TensorSCONE that were
done by an unauthorized party must be detectable and should not
compromise the internal state and functioning. In addition, while
designing a practical system based on the strawman design, we aim
to achieve the following design goals.
• Transparency: The secure framework must offer the same
interface as the unprotected framework, and should unmod-
ified existing applications based on TensorFlow.
• Performance:We aim to impose as little overhead as possible
when adding security to the machine learning framework.
• Accuracy:We do not aim to trade-off accuracy for security.
Accuracy will be the same of the native TensorFlow frame-
work as when using no security protection.
3.2 Detailed Design
The design of TensorSCONE is composed of two components: (a)
the TensorSCONE controller that provides the necessary runtime
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environment for securing the TensorFlow library, and (b) Ten-
sorSCONE TensorFlow library that allows deploying unmodified
existing TensorFlow applications. We next describe these two com-
ponents in detail.
3.3 TensorSCONE Controller
General architecture. The TensorSCONE controller is based on
the SCONE shielded execution framework. The TensorSCONE
controller runs inside a Docker container [35]. No changes to the
Docker engine is required. Inside the enclave, the controller pro-
vides a runtime environment for TensorFlow, which includes the
network shield, the file system shield, user-level threading. These sub-
systems are required in order to transparently support unmodified
existing TensorFlow applications inside the SGX environment. Data
that is handled through file descriptors is transparently encrypted
and authenticated through the shields. The shields apply at each
location where an application would usually trust the operating
system, such as when using sockets or writing files to disk. The
shields perform sanity checks on data passed from operating sys-
tem to enclave to prevent Iago attacks [21]. More specifically, these
checks include bound checks and checking for manipulated point-
ers. This protection is required to fulfill the goal of not requiring
the application to deal with untrusted systems.
File system shield. The file system shield protects confidentiality
and integrity of data files. Whenever the application would write a
file, the shield either encrypts and authenticates, simply authenti-
cates or passes the file as is. The choice depends on user-defined
path prefixes, which are part of the configuration of an enclave.
The shield splits files into chunks that are then handled separately.
Metadata for these chunks is kept inside the enclave, meaning it is
protected from manipulation. The secrets used for these operations
are different from the secrets used by the SGX implementation.
They are instead configuration parameters at the startup time of
the enclave.
Network shield. TensorFlow applications do not inherently in-
clude end-to-end encryption for network traffic. Users who want
to add security must apply other means to secure the traffic, such
as a proxy for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Accord-
ing to the threat model however, data may not leave the enclave
unprotected, because the system software is not trusted. Network
communicationmust therefore always be end-to-end protected. Our
network shield wraps sockets, and all data passed to a socket will
be processed by the network shield instead of the system software.
The shield then transparently wraps the communication channel
in a TLS connection on behalf of the user application. The keys for
TLS are saved in files and protected by the file system shield.
User-level threading. Enclave transitions are costly and should
therefore be avoided when possible. Many system calls require a
thread to exit userspace and enter kernel space for processing. To
avoid thread transitions out of enclaves as much as possible, the
controller implements user space threading.
When the OS assigns a thread to an enclave, it first executes an
internal scheduler to decide, which application thread to execute.
These application threads are then mapped to SGX thread control
structures. When an application thread blocks, the controller is
run again to assign the OS thread to a different application thread
syscall futex sched_yield nanosleep munmap brk
time (s) 6421 448 441 0.09 0.05
time (%) 87.83 6.14 6.04 ~0 ~0
Table 1: System calls required by TensorFlow for training
1,000 steps of the Cifar-10 model, which took about 19:30
min of real time (including overhead from the measure-
ment).
instead of passing control back to the operating system. In this
way, the number of costly thread transitions is reduced. When no
application thread is ready for execution, the OS either backs off
and waits inside the enclave, or outside, depending on the time
required for an enclave transition. A side effect of this user-level
threading scheme is that the controller does not require more OS
threads than CPUs available to achieve full CPU utilization, which
is usually the case for applications running under a conventional
OS.
3.4 TensorSCONE TensorFlow Library
Machine learning applications consist of two major steps. In the
first step, the model is trained, and thereafter, the model is employed
for classification or decision tasks. We next explain the two stages
of the workflow: training process and classification process.
Training process. For the training process, we use the full version
of TensorFlow. Training in TensorFlow is usually performed on
acceleration hardware such as GPUs and distributed across multiple
machines. However, the TensorSCONE controller requires SGX
which is only available for CPUs.We therefore only support training
on CPU. This limitation reduces the performance of the training
process, but additional security is added.
The TensorSCONE controller allows easy distribution of the
application in form of docker images. The training instances of
TensorSCONE can be distributed on multiple nodes, each running
separate SGX hardware. The network shield applies transparent
protection of the communication channel between instances. Scal-
ing on the same instance, that is, on the same CPU is possible, but
does decrease relative performance, because the limiting factor in
our environment is EPC size, which is fixed for each CPU. Only
horizontal scaling with more instances can increase performance.
The system calls required by TensorFlow can be seen in Table 1.
Again, most time is spend handling futex.
Classification process. The main reason for dividing the classifi-
cation and training process in our design is that we can use different
TensorFlow variants for each step. SCONE imposes less overhead, if
applications have a smaller memory footprint, because the limited
EPC size is the major bottleneck. TensorFlow Lite has a smaller
memory footprint because it targets mobile devices. The drawback
is however that it cannot perform training by design. Therefore,
we can only use it for classification.
When protecting TensorFlow Lite with SCONE, the framework
uses the SCONE C library instead of the common system library.
The internals of TensorFlow Lite do not otherwise require change,
as long as the interface of the SCONE C library is fully compatible.
The most common system calls required by TensorFlow Lite can
be seen in Table 2. Most time is spent to handle futex, which is
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syscall futex read munmap write
time (s) 4.68 0.06 0.004 ~0
time (%) 98.73 1.18 0.09 ~0
Table 2: System calls required by TensorFlow Lite for classi-
fying 1,000 images, which took about 7:30 min of real time
(including overhead from the measurement).
a userspace lock that does not require switching to kernel space.
The interface for using the classification method of TensorSCONE
is the same as for TensorFlow Lite. Graph definitions created for
TensorFlow Lite are compatible.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
We next explain how we put the design of TensorSCONE into
practice. TensorSCONE is upstreamed and integrated with the
SCONE framework.
4.1 Training Process
The typical user of TensorFlow uses the Python API for defining
and training graphs, because it is the richest API. Using Python
with SCONE would impose additional complexity because it re-
quires the dynamic library open (dlopen) system call for imports.
As the name implies, dlopen dynamically loads libraries during
runtime of a program. However, SGX does not allow an enclave
to be entered by a thread, unless it has been finalized according to
the procedures of enclave creation. A library that is dynamically
loaded would therefore not be represented in the enclave’s attesta-
tion hash. Consequently, dlopen is disabled by default for SCONE
applications. The designer of a SCONE service can decide to allow
dlopen by configuring the SCONE environment accordingly. Doing
so requires further deliberation, if the security is not to be compro-
mised. The standard way for handling this case is to authenticate
loaded libraries during runtime through the file system shield.
The TensorFlow repository offered convenience scripts for cre-
ating Python packages for distributing TensorFlow. Compiling the
packages with the SCONE failed, because parts of the Python pack-
age require the fork system call, whichwas not yet fully available in
SCONE during the time of this work. The implementation for fork
in SCONE was available, but not yet part of the SCONE release.
We therefore decided to support only the C++ API for Tensor-
Flow. The C++ version covers the low-level API of TensorFlow,
meaning many convenience features such as estimators or moni-
tored training are not available. However, the TensorFlow core is
written in C++, and the C++ API is feature complete in a sense that
everything that can be done with the Python API can also be done
with the C++ API, but requires more verbose source code.
There is one approach that let us use the convenience of the
Python API for the definition of the graph. TensorFlow allows ex-
porting graphs and parameters, such as learned biases that were
created in the current session. Graph definitions and checkpoints
containing the parameters can later be imported by another pro-
gram. Importing and exporting are available in both the C++ and
the Python API, and they use interchangeable exchange formats.
The user can therefore define a graph with the more high level
Python API, including data inputs, and later import and run it with
Figure 3: Interface and flow of TensorSCONE. The user ei-
ther provides a C++ program building and running a Tensor-
Flow graph, converts it with a TensorSCONE toolchain to a
binary that can be run in a SCONE container. Alternatively,
a Python program exporting a graph, and a corresponding
C++ program for training the graph can be provided.
C++. If the application does not by default already export its model
with a named interface, changes are required to the original pro-
gram, so that either the name of operations in the graph can be
known, or an interface is defined.
For the training process, we used the full version of TensorFlow,
not to be confused with TensorFlow Lite. A graph definition must be
provided by the user in form of a graph frozen by a script packaged
together with TensorFlow, when using either the Python or C++
API. If the user has used the C++ API for the definition, the full
source definition of the graph can also be used.
A frozen graph can be created from a graph definition exported
from the Python script that defines the graph in the Protocol Buffers
([8]) exchange format. A checkpoint file containing all values of
a graph that are not part of the graph definition, such as weights,
biases and counters can be exported as well.
Alternatively, the graph can also be exported as a blank slate
without any initialized internal values. The initialization can then
be done inside the TensorSCONE environment, which is useful
if a user wants to train the graph protected by SGX for the entire
training process. The initialization operations are required when
using the Python API and are therefore usually part of the exported
graph.
The user must also provide the inputs for training, such as a
set of annotated images. The code written for classification must
use the TensorFlow Lite API. If the confidentiality of the training
material is required, the file system shield of SCONE can be used.
The configuration is straightforward and can be easily distributed
through SCONE mechanisms. An overview of the interface and
usage workflow can be seen in Figure 3.
4.2 Classification Process
We implemented our design for the classification process by running
the TensorFlow Lite framework with SCONE. For testing, we used
the C++ API. We first ensured that TensorFlow Lite compiles with
the musl C library on Alpine Linux [1], because SCONE uses a
modified version of the musl library. The Docker containers built
for distributing SCONE are also based on Alpine. Alpine Linux is
a lightweight Linux distribution that uses the musl C library by
default.
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Musl is designed to be compatible with glibc without changes
to the application. In practice however, changes can be necessary
as we will show. Identical code folding(ICF) is a compiler or linker
feature that eliminates identical function bodies at compile or link
time in order to reduce the binary size. It is currently supported by
gcc and the gold linker, but not by the musl linker or the compiler
wrapper for musl. We therefore removed the ICF option for the
binary targets in the TensorFlow source tree. Compiling the Ten-
sorFlow framework with and without ICF provides similar binary
sizes. Therefore, the performance cost when deactivating ICF will
also be minimal.
TensorFlow also uses backtrace by default. This library is spe-
cific for glibc. We therefore could not use it directly with musl.
There are unstable alternatives and stubs available to replace back-
trace for Alpine Linux programs, but we decided to disable the
option entirely to avoid pulling more unstable dependencies into
the project [2]. One way for disabling dependencies is to add com-
pile guards to conditionally only compile a dependency into the
binary, when certain circumstances are met, such as compiling
against the musl libc. I
The TensorFlow source uses Bazel as a build tool [3]. Bazel was
first, like TensorFlow, developed internally by Google and released
into public in 2015.
Integrating SCONE into an application in the simplest case
merely requires compiling the application with a SCONE-specific
wrapper for gcc, but it can be more complex in practice. Bazel al-
lows the configuration of custom build chains that can be specified
by a command line switch when invoking Bazel for builds. The
configuration of the toolchain we created is described in section
4.3.
SCONE uses environmental variables for specifying the amount
of memory available for heap and stack when running the enclave.
The default stack size was enough when running TensorFlow Lite.
For the heap size, a minimum of about 220 MB had to be set for
the classification of up to a tested amount of 1,000 images. After
classification, images were not kept in memory, meaning higher
classification counts do not need more memory.
We confirmed the correctness of the implementation by com-
paring the classification results delivered by TensorSCONE with
the results of native TensorFlow Lite. We checked the values of the
top four labels. They had the exact same percentage and order in
both cases, when classifying images randomly picked from the web.
We could therefore be sure that classification with TensorSCONE
works correctly.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no standalone version
of TensorFlow Lite available, meaning a user of TensorFlow Lite
needs to build their application inside the TensorFlow source folder,
with dependency targets set to TensorFlow Lite. This is a major
limitation for existing projects. Bazel also does not link library
targets unless a binary target is created, which means TensorFlow
Lite cannot be easily released from the source tree by compiling all
libraries, and move them to the system’s include directories.
We added compile targets that force linking as a workaround.
The libraries could then be moved to other projects along with the
header files, and used as third party dependencies. With this, we
wrote a classifier service from scratch. The service takes classifi-
cation requests via network, and uses TensorFlow Lite for classifi-
cation. The classifier service serves as a proof of concept. It is not
used for the performance tests, because the service also implements
a custom communication protocol, which is out of scope for the
measurements.
For testing, we used an example available in the TensorFlow
Lite source, which takes its inputs from the hard drive and prints
the classification results to console. Presumably, for benchmarking
purposes, the authors included a command line option to run the
classification subroutine for a certain number of times. We used
this option to simulate batch processing of many images at once,
without requiring to restart enclaves every run.
4.3 TensorSCONE Toolchain
Our solution to compile TensorFlow applications for SGX was to
setup a new toolchain for SCONE inside the TensorFlow repository.
Tools for cross compilation for ARM processors or CUDA capa-
ble GPUs were already available in the TensorFlow repository. A
toolchain definition requires the configuration of paths to specific
tools such as the linker ld, GNU Compiler Collection gcc and other
tools. Furthermore, the correct include paths for system libraries
and other options must be configured. For SCONE, this included
dynamic and position independent linking. Defining a toolchain
was the cleanest solution, because it allows users to easily switch
between compilers without side effects. It was also necessary to
define a toolchain, when different tools are required for different
parts of the project. The Protobuf compiler for example could be
used with the native toolchain. Another solution for compiling
TensorFlow Lite with SCONE was to set the environment variables
CC and CXX to the SCONE C and C++ compilers. This solution only
worked when the Bazel output path was set to a custom path out-
side of the build directory. According to the Bazel documentation,
this is intended for debugging purposes. When using this approach,
the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable needed to be set to
the output folder. This solution should be avoided, because tools
required only by the compilation host will also be compiled with
the SCONE toolchain, making cross compilation impossible.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we first present the experimental setup. Thereafter,
we evaluate a real world application of TensorSCONE by training
the Cifar-10 model.
5.1 Experimental Setup
For all experiments, we used servers running Ubuntu Linux with a
4.4.0 Linux kernel, equipped with an Intel© Xeon© CPU E3-1280 v6
at 3.90GHz and 64 GBmain memory. This processor was released in
early 2017 and supports SGX. The gcc release for compiling the glibc
versions was 5.4.0. The gcc release on which SCONE builds is 7.3.0.
Before the actual measurements, we warmed up the machine by
running at full load with IO heavy operations that require swapping
of EPC pages. We performed measurements for classification and
training both with and without the file system shield. For full end-
to-end protection, the file system shield was required.
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Figure 4: The Cifar-10 image set contains 60,000 32x32 pixel
images divided into 10 classes.
5.2 TensorFlow Application
For demonstrating the usage of TensorSCONE, we ported a train-
ing application written in Python to the TensorFlow C++ API and
ran it with TensorSCONE. The training application trains the Cifar-
10 data set and can be found in the models-project associated with
TensorFlow [11].
Dataset: Cifar-10. The Cifar-10 image set [33] is a labeled subset
of a much larger set of small pictures of size 32x32 pixels collected
from the Internet. It contains a total of 60,000 pictures. Each picture
belongs to one of ten classes, which are evenly distributed, making
a total of 6,000 images per class. All labels were manually set by
human labelers. An example of classes and images can be seen in
Figure 4. Cifar-10 has the distinct advantage that a reasonable good
model can be trained in a relatively short time. The set is freely
available for research purposes and has been extensively used for
benchmarking machine learning techniques [28, 29, 66].
Model a.k.a. the graph. The model we trained to classify the
Cifar-10 data set is a convolutional neural network. It consists of
two convolutional layers, each followed by max pooling, and three
fully connected layers with rectified linear unit (ReLU ) activation
functions. Softmax is used for deciding the classes.
For creating the graph, we used the Python API and exported
the graph to a Protobuf file. We realized the training loop with the
C++ API. For this, we first imported the graph from the Protobuf
file, and looped over the training function we defined in the Python
part. Queue runners, hooks and other parts that are automatically
handled when training with the high level Python API had to be
manually implemented.
The images are read from disk through a FixedLengthRecordReader.
This class enables the input of images into tensors. It dedicates a full
thread to this task. Threads are automatically handled in Python
with the MonitoredTrainingSession API. For C++, we had to
manually create a thread and bind the correct node to it.
To enrich the inputs and mitigate overfitting of the model, the
original images from the Cifar-10 data set are distorted. This virtu-
ally enlarges the data set and allows for more generalized models.
First, only random 24x24 pixel crops are taken from each 32x32
original image. Next, each image is randomly flipped, and has its
brightness and saturation adjusted. These image distortion func-
tions are part of the image-API of the Python API. The augmented
data is randomly shuffled and fed into the model. For training, the
cross entropy loss of the softmax function is minimized.
Application implementation. Defining a graph in TensorFlow
creates nodes or operations, at which the inputs are reshaped and
produced into the outputs. The flow of the data is realized through
tensors. Operations can be executed by passing the operation to a
run call, both in the C++ and Python API of TensorFlow. Training
can be realized by defining an operation that performs a single
gradient descent in the model, and then looping over that operation.
Both the C++ and Python API offer functions to import and export
graphs and their parameters, allowing saving the trained graph,
and using it for classification from a different application.
The most distinctive difference between both APIs for training is
the MonitoredTrainingSession, which is offered for the Python
API. It allows convenient registration of hooks when running the
session, initializes all variables and starts all worker threads in-
volved in the graph, such as threads reading the images from disk
or processing the shuffle queue. This hides complexity from the
user, because there is no need to keep track of required threads or
names of operations. These operations all have to be done manually
with the C++ API, increasing both the amount of code that needs
to be written. It also makes it necessary to expose internals of the
graph in form of the names of internal operations for filling queues
and reading images. The names can be set manually, if we have
the possibility to author the graph definition. When the source
of the graph is not available, the names of the operations can be
found using TensorBoard, which is a tool for the visualization of
TensorFlow executions [9].
The queue operations are blocking and had to be moved to differ-
ent threads. The C++ standard library offers std::thread objects,
which can be used to run the operations concurrently. They are also
compatible with SCONE, which does by default offer four thread
control structures for execution, which is sufficient in our scenario.
The initialization of variables can be performed in the Python
code that builds the graph before exporting. The initialized variables
are then saved in a checkpoint file that is also exported. The values
for the variables can then be loaded on the C++ side. Alternatively,
another operation that initializes the variables could be added to
the graph and then run with the C++ API.
5.3 Performance of the Classification Phase
We first evaluate the performance of TensorSCONE for the classi-
fication process.
5.3.1 Data set and model. The data set we used for benchmarking
TensorSCONE consists of a single bitmap image. For the latency
measurement, we calculated the average over 1,000 classifications
performed by TensorFlow Lite. We conducted measurements for the
native versions using glibc and musl, SCONE in simulation mode
and SCONE running on SGX hardware.Nativemeans execution that
was performed without SGX and therefore also without SCONE.
Native executions ran, like the versions using SCONE, inside a
Docker container. The performance influence of Docker is therefore
out of the equation.
Themodel we used for the classification of the images is Inception-
v4 [56]. It achieves 3.08% top-5 error on the ImageNet classification
challenge data set, making it state-of-the-art. A pre-trained model
is hosted in the TensorFlow repository [7]. A version already con-
verted to the TensorFlow Lite Protobuf serialization format is also
available. We estimate that training Inception from scratch would
take months with the hardware we had at our disposal.
We manually checked the correctness of a single classification by
classifying the image with the TensorFlow label image application
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Figure 5: Latency in seconds when classifying images with
TensorFlow Lite, using native execution with glibc, native
execution with musl, SCONE with SGX hardware mode and
SCONE with simulation mode.
involving no self-written code and running directly on the host
without containerization. We later compared the results to the ones
provided by TensorSCONE and could confirm that indeed the same
result was produced.
5.3.2 Results. We present the results in Figure 5. In this section,
we explain the results and evaluate the influence of heap size and
file system shield on the performance.
#1: Latency.When compiled with glibc, TensorFlow Lite had the
smallest latency (shown in red). The version using musl (green line)
had about 30% greater latency. Both C libraries excel in different
areas, but glibc has the edge over musl in most areas, according
to microbenchmarks [4], because glibc is tailored for performance,
whereasmusl is geared towards small size. Because of this difference
in goals, an application may be faster with musl or glibc, depending
on the performance bottlenecks that limit the application. Differ-
ences in performance of both C libraries must therefore be expected.
The deviation from the average of each single measurement was
very low.
#2: Throughput. The performance when executing with SCONE
in simulation mode (blue) was slightly higher than compared with
native musl execution. One reason for this might be that SCONE
handles certain system calls inside the enclave and does not need
to exit to the kernel. In simulation mode, the execution is not per-
formed inside the enclave, but SCONE still handles some system
calls in userspace, which can positively affect performance. An
analysis with the strace tool yields that some of the most costly
system calls of TensorSCONE are indeed system calls that are
handled internally by the SCONE runtime.
The time it takes to classify a single image also determines the
throughput of TensorSCONE. We compare the throughput of dif-
ferent configurations in Table 3. The throughput of SCONE in
hardware mode was about 0.32 of the throughput of native musl, as
seen in Table 3. While we expected some decrease in throughput,
this result is considerably lower than 0.6 times native throughput,
native glibc native musl simulation SGX
throughput (1/s) 2.685 2.081 2.314 0.848
compared to native 1 0.78 0.86 0.32
Table 3: Throughput of various configurations in classifica-
tions per second.We compare a version running native glibc,
native musl, TensorSCONE with simulated SGX, and Ten-
sorSCONE with hardware SGX.
Figure 6: The plot shows the required time for read and
write calls in correlation to the total memory an enclave
has allocated. A drastic decrease of performance of read and
write calls occurs, when the touchedmemory resides outside
the EPC. This serves as an explanation for the seen latency
when classifying with TensorSCONE (taken from [15]).
which is the lower bound of throughput compared to native execu-
tion that SCONE achieves, given by the authors of SCONE. A reason
for getting subpar results might be the larger main memory area
TensorFlow requires compared to the applications tested by the
SCONE authors. Let’s consider a microbenchmark presented in [15].
The key-value store Memcached for example, which achieved 1.2x
the throughput of native execution when running with SCONE,
has a binary size of less than 1 MB. The default and intended size
of cache available for Memcached is 64 MB, which is lower than a
typical EPC size of 90 MB. It is therefore possible that Memcached
does not exceed the EPC during the benchmarks. The size of the
classification binary with SCONE, on the other hand, was 1.2 MB,
a required library needed 15 MB, and the model that is required
for classification took another 163 MB. Finally, the image needed
1 MB of space. A check with the Linux time tool showed that the
classification process required about 330 MB in main memory for
classification, regardless of the number of images. This led to more
paging because it exceeded the typical EPC size. The results of a
microbenchmark conducted in [15] can be seen in Figure 6. When
the allocated memory is larger than the EPC size, the performance
of reads and writes severely degrades. The same effect could have
led to reduced performance when running TensorFlow Lite.
#3: Effect of heap size. The amount of configured SCONE_HEAP
did not significantly affect performance, as long as it is set to the
required minimum of about 330MB or higher. This variable controls
how much heap memory SCONE allows the application to allocate.
In general, applicationsmay gain performancewith higher available
main memory, when the application can scale with main memory.
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simulation mode hardware mode
time (s) w/o fss 2,157 5,875
time (s) w/ fss 2,163 5,990
Table 4: Comparison of classification times of Ten-
sorSCONE for 1,000 images with SCONE in simulation and
hardware mode, and with and without file system shield.
The heap size was kept at a fixed value.
Examples of scaling with memory include applications that use
more aggressive caching or launch additional threads.
This common law is invalid in the SGX environment, because
of limited EPC size. A filled EPC requires swapping to unprotected
main memory, when more pages are to be allocated, which again
requires costly calculations in order to protect the data. Applications
that scale with the amount of available memory may benefit from
having virtually less available memory, because using more main
memory potentially leads to more EPC swapping operations. When
the benefits of having less EPC page swaps outweigh the benefits
of having more available main memory, the user should configure
the heap size available for the SCONE application to be artificially
smaller than the actual available amount.
#4: Effect of file system shield. Using the file system shield had
minimal influence on the performance of the classification process,
as can be seen in Table 4. In simulation mode, TensorSCONE with
file system shield took about 1% longer for training, whereas in
hardware mode, the difference was 2%.
The shield uses Intel-CPU-specific hardware instructions for
performing cryptographic operations. These instructions can reach
a throughput of up to 4 GB/s, while the model is about 150 MB
in size. This leads to a negligible overhead on the startup of the
application only.
5.4 Performance of the Training Phase
Next, we evaluate the performance of TensorSCONEwhen training
a model. We answer the question of how costly additional threads
are, both at application and SCONE level, and the effect of the
maximum heap size granted for the application. We made separate
measurements with the file system shield enabled and disabled to
isolate the performance impact of it.
5.4.1 Data set. The model we trained was the convolutional neu-
ral network we also used for demonstrating that training with
TensorSCONE works in general. The data set was again Cifar-10.
Both items are described in section 5.2. We trained the model up
to 10,000 steps. Each step consisted of forward passing 128 images
and adjusting the weights for each image through backward passes.
Each epoch consisted of 50,000 images in total, which means we
trained the model over 25 times with each image available for train-
ing. Since the images were perturbed, training on the same image
multiple times still improved accuracy.
5.4.2 Results. The results of themeasurementwhen training 10,000
step in total can be seen in Figure 7. The precision we reach after
training was about 80%. Training longer, the model can reach up to
87%. In this section, we describe different aspects and implications
of the results.
simulation mode hardware mode
thread # 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
time (s) w/o fss 3,45 3,32 3,32 3,32 10,31 12,61 16,62 19,93
time (s) w/ fss 3,50 3,35 3,36 3,35 10,29 12,73 16,87 20,05
Table 5: Comparison of Cifar-10 training times of Ten-
sorSCONE with SCONE in simulation and hardware mode,
with different thread counts, and with and without file sys-
tem shield. The heap size was kept at a fixed value.
#1: Latency. The results of the latency measurements have simi-
larities to the results observed during the classification process in
section 5.3.2. Deviation of the measurements is low. Running with
SCONE in hardware mode roughly caused a fourfold decrease in
performance. This is an additional factor compared to the training
step. The difference between native musl and SCONE in simulation
mode was also much higher than during classification. The addi-
tional performance overhead implied by SCONE may stem from
the overall worsened performance of musl when training. When
set to SGX simulation, system calls are handled in userspace, what
makes the performance of this approach almost on par with native
glibc.
#2 Effect of heap size. Setting SCONE heap size to values higher
than what is minimally required caused only small latency increases
in total. TensorSCONE did not scale to available memory. The
minimally required heap size is therefore also the maximum heap
size used at any given time. We confirmed this by comparing the
minimally required heap size that is required for training with
SCONE, with the memory allocated by the process in total when
no restrictions on heap size were made.
Additional heap size is still allocated and reserved by SCONE.
While this does not directly affect the total count of pages required
in the EPC at the same time, it may still lead to decreased perfor-
mance because of memory fragmentation. Memory fragmentation
causes increased page swapping, when pages are not used to full ex-
tent, but instead only partially filled.Whenmore pages are available,
the allocator is more likely to choose pages in a fashion that causes
fragmentation. We conclude that when using TensorSCONE, we
should always aim to find the minimally required heap size, which
depends on the individual model served.
#3: Effect of thread count. The number of threads we varied is
the number of threads dedicated to forward passing tensors and up-
dating weights. The application still required two additional threads
to handle reading images from disk, and for handling queues.
We can tell from the marginal performance improvement in
Figure 7 that the pure training task is scantly parallelizable on a
single machine. Available resources were already effectively used.
The performance gain from multiple threads when training was
consistent, but negligible.
We did learn however that multithreading is possible in gen-
eral with TensorSCONE, and from the sharp increase in latency
we could also estimate the costs for additional threads in Ten-
sorSCONE.
#4: Effect of file system shield. The measurement results when
running with the file system shield enabled are almost identical to
the results when not using the file system shield. We compare both
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Figure 7: Latency of the training process for different available heap sizes for TensorFlow. In a single step, 128 images were
passed forward in the model, loss and gradients are calculated, and the weights and biases are adjusted accordingly, meaning
the model was trained to recognize the images. We also varied the thread count for the gradient calculation.
values in Table 5. The results when running with file system shield
are on average insignificantly higher than when running without
file system shield.
Multiple factors hide potential overheads of the file system shield.
As explained in section 5.3.2, SCONE can reach a throughput of
up to 4 GB/s for cryptographic operations, whereas model and
data were 150 MB in size, respectively. Furthermore, the data was
concurrently prepared for the neural network, meaning potential
latency may have been hidden in concurrency, because all decryp-
tion was performed by the thread filling the queue. The data queue
was usually filled completely, meaning the training calculations
dominated reading and decrypting images.
6 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we summarize the related work about secure ma-
chine learning, and shielded execution based on Intel SGX.
Early work on preserving privacy for data mining techniques
have relied on randomizing user data [13, 23, 46]. These approaches
trade acurracy for privacy. The work of Du et al. [23] includes
a parameter that allows making a trade-off between privacy and
accuracy. The used algorithms aim to provide privacy preserving
collection of data, and do not protect the results themselves in the
cloud, nor do they secure the classification phase. Further, we target
to provide the same accuracy level as the native execution.
An approach reaching the same accuracy as unprotected variants
is to perform machine learning on encrypted data. Bost et al. [20]
developed protocols to perform privacy preserving classification.
While this can protect the privacy of the users of a classification
service, it does not cover training as in TensorSCONE.
Graepel et al. [25] developed machine learning algorithms to
perform both training and classification on encrypted data. The
solution is based on the properties of homomorphic encryption. A
homomorphic encryption scheme allows operations, such as multi-
plication and addition, on encrypted data, so that the result can be
decrypted by the owner of the private key to yield the same as when
performing the operation on the plaintext data. However, homomor-
phic encryption schemes provide restrictive compute operations,
and incur high performance overheads.
Shielded execution provides strong security guarantees for legacy
applications running on untrusted platforms [17]. Prominent exam-
ples includeHaven [17], SCONE [15], Graphene-SGX [60], Panoply [52],
and Eleos [39]. Our work builds on the SCONE framework.
Recently, there has been a significant interest in designing secure
data analytics systems based on shielded execution. For instance,
VC3 [51] applies SGX to the domain of big data processing by ap-
plying it to the Hadoop MapReduce framework. Along the same
lines, Moat [54] proves confidentiality of enclave programs. To this
end, Moat applies theorem proving and information flow analysis.
Opaque [69] uses Intel SGX to provide oblivious computing to a
secure distributed data analytics applications. Likewise, Ryoan [30]
provides a distributed sandbox for untrusted computation on secret
data leveraging Intel SGX. EnclaveDB [41] is a shielded in-memory
SQL database. SGXBOUNDS [34] provides a lightweight memory
safety techniques for SGX-based enclaves. In the domain of net-
work data processing, Slick [58] and ShieldBox [59] use SGX to
build a secure middlebox framework for high-performance network
processing. In the domain of storage, Pesos [31] focuses on secure
data storage using a combination Intel SGX and Kinetic storage.
Speicher [16] presents a secure LSM-based KV store using shielded
execution. Among all of the recent work, the work from Ohrimenko
et al. [36] is the most relevant for TensorSCONE, where they lever-
aged Intel SGX to secure specific machine learning operators. In
contrast to work from Ohrimenko et al. [36], we present the first
generic machine learning framework based on the widely-used Ten-
sorFlow framework, which can support a wide-range of unmodified
existing TensorFlow applications.
Currently, TensorSCONE does not make use of GPUs to deploy
TensorFlow operators since they do not provide a TEE. In this space,
Graviton [63] recently proposed hardware extensions to provide
a secure environment on GPUs. We plan to leverage Graviton’s
extensions for deploying TensorSCONE applications on GPUs.
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Typically, machine learning applications, by their nature, are
error-tolerant [68]. Meanwhile, approximate computing has re-
cently emerged as a design paradigm that allows us to make a
trade-off between the out quality, performance, and computing re-
sources for data analytics [32, 42–48, 64, 65]. Therefore, a promising
approach to further improve the performance of TensorSCONE,
i.e., to reduce the computation overhead inside enclaves, is to apply
approximate computing techniques.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced TensorSCONE, a secure TensorFlow-
basedmachine learning framework leveraging the hardware-assisted
trusted execution environment (TEE) based on Intel SGX. More
specifically, we have presented the design of TensorSCONE based
on the integration of TensorFlow with the SCONE shielded execu-
tion framework. We have implemented TensorSCONE as a fully
functional system supporting many useful optimizations to over-
come the architectural limitations of Intel SGX in the context of
building a secure machine learning system. TensorSCONE sup-
ports both training and classification phases while providing all
three important design properties for the secure machine learning
workflow: transparency, accuracy, and performance. Our evaluation
shows that TensorSCONE incurs reasonable performance over-
heads, while providing strong security properties against a powerful
adversary.
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